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THE DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA LABOR LAW
J. CARRINGTON GRAMLING. JR.*
This article will deal primarily with the relationship of management
and organized labor. It will not include such co-relative subjects as work-
men's compensation, child labor laws, unemployment compensation and
craft legislation, i.e., Barber's Code, Elevator and Boiler Inspection Bills, and
the like. It will have for its emphasis the field of labor law commonly re-
ferred to as injunctions and unfair labor practices.
1. PEACEFUL STRIKES AND PICKETING
The first act of the Legislature of the State of Florida that can properly
be defined as a true labor law is Chapter 4144, Laws of 1893, which was
entitled "An Act to Prohibit Wrongful Combinations Against Workmen
and to Punish the Same." This statute has been retained unchanged in
Florida law until today it is F.S.A. 833.02. The statute prohibits the practice
known as "black-listing" by employers, or for that matter, anyone else. The
pertinent part reads, "If two or more persons shall agree, conspire, combine
or confederate together for the purpose of preventing any person from pro-
curing work in any firm or corporation, or to cause the discharge of any per-
son from work in such firm or corporation . . . shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding $500.00 each, or by imprisonmcnt not exceeding one year."
It should be noted that this does not forbid procuring discharge from an
individual.
Thus, the earliest statutory unfair labor practice in Florida is black-
listing. Wurt's Digest, 1904, under the heading of "Master and Servant",
rather than the modem heading "Labor", cites one lone Florida case, Chip-
ley v. Atkinson,1 a case arising before the above quoted statute. The Chipley
case was a suit for damages for wrongful discharge by an employee. The
employee brought suit because an officer of the Pensacola & Atlantic Rail-
road Company refused to extend gratuitously a spur line of the railroad
company to the plant of Kehoe & Walker if Kchoc & Walker retained plain-
tiff (Atkinson) in their employ. The court held in essence that a malicious
causing of a discharge was a cause of action under the common law of the
State of Florida. There was no proof as to the tenure of employment, no
employment contract and no adequate measure of damages suffered by the
employee on a contractual basis. It appears that damages were more in
connection with malicious libel and slander which brought about the wrong-
ful discharge. Thus, the action constituted a special libel or slander, although
*Member of Florida Bar.
1. 23 Fla. 260, 1 So. 934 (1887).
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such libel or slander was not actionable per se. This case was apparently
the precursor of the 1893 Act of the Legislature.
In 1899 the Legislature of the State passed another law which was man-
datory in its nature.2 It provided that employers of assistants in mer-
cantile or other business pursuits, requiring such employees to stand or walk
during active duties, should furnish at their own cost suitable chairs or seats
for the use of these employees when not engaged in their active work. The
law further provided that employees required to be on their feet in connec-
tion with their duties should be given a humane opportunity to sit down and
rest. Obviously the employer who failed to provide seats for his employees
and provide a humane opportunity for them to sit down and rest would be
guilty of an unfair labor practice. This law was put in the form of a misde-
meanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $100.00 or imprisonment not
exceeding 60 days. This law has not been repealed..3
The first genuine labor case to come before the Supreme Court of
Florida was Jetton-Dekle Lumber Company v. Mather.4 In this case a large
contractor sought to enjoin a general strike as an unlawful conspiracy. The
strike had been called because the plaintiff's subcontractors had employed
non-union labor. The case was founded upon the former common law that
had declared any combination of workmen and any concerted action on the
part of workmen was an unlawful conspiracy. The supreme court stated:
Fortunately there have been few differences in this section of
the country between labor and capital and this is the first case
that has reached this Court.5
The court then weighed the old common law and made the following
finding of policy of the State of Florida:
Unquestionably an individual can stop work at any time without
cause, being liable only for breach of contract; and no element of
contract as between the complainant and these defendants is alleged.
Does the fact that more than one individual has quit work make a
difference, under the circumstances above stated? We may assume
that it is not universally true that many may do what one may
lawfully do, though this must be said with reservation, and that aIconspiracy' may cause a wrong which one man, acting by himself,
could not commit. But before the Courts can punish or prevent
a conspiracy, either the act conspired or the manner of its doing
must be unlawful. (Emphasis ours). Are not both alternatives
absent in the case of a simple strike? It is certainly lawful to
attempt by negotiation, or other peaceable ways, to get higher pay
for one's labor, and, if the demand is not met, to go elsewhere with
one's labor or to sit idle, if needs be, unless satisfactory arrange-
ments are made. Labor Unions in and of themselves cannot be
said to be unlawful, and yet one of the prime objectives of their
oxistence is by combinations of the supply to regulate the demand.
2. Fla. Spec. Laws 1899, c. 4762.
3. FLA. STAT. § 448.05 (1951).
4. 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
5. Id. at 973, 43 So. at 592.
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Some of the cases, particularly the English cases, stress the motive
underlying the strike and apparently hold that if the strike is to
better the condition of the workmen, it is lawful, but if it be to
punish the employer, it is unlawful. If this be the correct delimita-
tion, this case comes up to the rule. There is nothing personal to
the complainant in the strike, it is simply and entirely an endeavor
to obtain an advantage of the defendants.6
Thus, we see that the Supreme Court of Florida as long ago as 1907
held that what is lawful for one person to do is not made unlawful by the
fact that there is similar action taken by a large number of people. In
other words, participation by numbers cannot make unlawful that which is
lawful for one person to do.
Another point of interest in the Jetton-Dekle decision is that manage-
ment pleaded the ancient statute making it a misdemeanor to conspire for
the purpose of causing the discharge of any employee.7 Jetton-Delke claimed
that the union's activities were for the purpose of requiring the discharge of
the non-union employees. The supreme court held that this section will not
be applied to the case of union laborers who strike for the purpose of secur-
ing all the labor for themselves. This will become more significant as we
discuss later cases under our "Anti-Closed Shop Constitutional Amend-
ment."s
There were no further significant developments in the labor law of the
state until 1932. In the interim there were many cases filed throughout the
state, which were dealt with by Chancellors on an individual basis; but for
several reasons, mainly financial, the cases were not appealed. In 1932,
however, the supreme court handed down its decision in Paramount Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Mitchell.9 This case involved the question of picketing and is
the first significant case in Florida dealing with this particular subject. It
will be recalled that the gravamen of the Jetton-Dekle case, 10 was the ques-
tion of a strike. The bill of complaint in the Paramount Enterprises case
alleged that the defendants conspired to injure the plaintiff's business by
threatening the theatre-going public. The union posted pickets at the en-
trance to the theatres bearing signs stating that the complainant refused to
employ union motion picture operators. The union alleged that no force
or intimidation was used. The supreme court held:
It is well settled that employees have a right to combine and
fix the amount of their daily wage and to whom they will sell it.
It is also true that when under no contract they may quit the service
of another at any time they desire. It is alike true that employers
have a right to determine the daily wage they are willing to pay and
whom they employ. Members of a labor organization may presume
and confederate not to work except upon payment of an established
6. Id. at 974, 43 So. at 592.
7. FLA. STAT. § 833.02 (1951).
8. FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, § 12, as amended 1944.
9. 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328 (1932).
10. Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907).
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wage; they may without coercion bring their cause to the note of
public opinion in a peaceful manner.'1
Thus, the court settled the law of Florida to the effect that peaceful
picketing is lawful. The fact that the picketing in this instance was retalia-
tory was not developed by the supreme court. Therefore, at this time the
law of Florida recognized labor unions, the right to strike and the right to
picket peacefully.
The next case of importance arose in 1938, with Weissman v. Jureit.
12
The union had presented a contract which the court studied in detail and
generally found quite acceptable. The supreme court noted that the purpose
of the contract was to reduce the working hours per day to ten, but to
otherwise leave the salary the same.18  From the sympathetic recitation of
the facts, it is obvious that the supreme court based its decision, favorable to
labor, on the fact that the picketing was for a purpose which the court con-
sidered lawful. However, the language of the decision indicated its basis
was that the plaintiff employer failed to show violence and intimidation in
union activities. In other words, the supreme court in 1938 made it appear
that because it was peaceful picketing it was lawful. Nevertheless, it is
obvious that it was lawful not only because it was peaceful but because it
was for a purpose approved by the supreme court. Thus, in this decision,
we find the root of subsequent doctrines to the effect that picketing must
be for lawful purposes. Mere peaceful picketing as indicated in later cases
is not sufficient.
The next development in Florida labor law arose in Retail Clerks Union,
Local 779 of Miami v. Lerner Shops of Florida, Inc.14 In this case the union
picketed the Lerner Stores to obtain a union contract. None of the em-
ployees of Lerners were members of the union and there was no dispute
between Lerners and their employees as to wages and working conditions.
Lerners even had no objection to their employees becoming members of the
union and no strike was pending with their employees. The court found
that the sole purpose of the defendant was to secure an agreement to bring
the employees into the union. The supreme court affirmed Paramount
Enterprises v. Mitchell,18 but held that where there is no dispute between
11. Paramount Enterprise, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 413, 140 So. 328, 331
(1932).
12. 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (1938).
13. One of the witnesses testified that he had worked with plaintiff for five weeks.
lie was required to work six days a week and averaged daily eleven or eleven and one.half
hours and on each Friday he would put in about fifteen hours. White and colored labor
worked at the plant and shared toilet and bath facilities. Another witness testified that
he was a member of the union and had worked at the bakery for some time and was
joining in the strike; the men worked for twelve and one-half hours to fifteen hours per
day and that this witness received $27.00 per week; lie received no pay for extra time;
the toilet and bath facilities were shared by white and colored employees; his time aver-
aged daily twelve hours. Another witness testified that he worked at the plant seven
months. His salary was $18.00 per week and he worked more than ten hours per day,
with at least seventy-five hours per week.
14. 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 529 (1939).
15. 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328 (1932).
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management and its immediate employees the union picketing is not justi-
fied. An immediate relationship of employer and employee is necessary.
It held:
Peaceful picketing will not be permitted for the purpose of
dictating the policy of an owner's business, to determine whom he
will employ or to intimidate him in the management of his
business. 18
The Florida Supreme Court again brings out the fact that it will sit in judg-
ment on the purpose of picketing. If it approves of that purpose of the
picketing, as in the Jureit Bakery case,17 it will permit picketing, otherwise
not.
It was at this point that the Supreme Court of the United States
decided American Federation of Labor v. Swing."" The Swing case was very
similar in its facts to the Florida Retail Clerk case.' 9 The Supreme Court
of the United States stated:
The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by
the notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an
injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined
by statute or by the judicial organ of the state. A state cannot
exclude working men from peacefully exercising the right of free
communication by drawing the circle of economic competition be-
tween employers and workers so small as to contain only an employ-
er and those directly employed by him. The interdependence of
economic interest also engaged in the same industry has become
a commonplace.20
Fundamentally, the Florida law remained unchanged during the years
of World War IT, and it was not until 1948 that the Supreme Court of
Florida decided Whitehead v. Miami Laundry Co.,21 in which the court
stated that the effect of the Lerner case had been abrogated. 22 The White-
head case was filed for the primary purpose of testing the validity of the
statute requiring a majority of the employees of any plant to take a secret
strike ballot before a lawful strike could be declared. The court ruled that
the pickets in this case were former employees of Miami Laundry and were
acting in retaliation for abuses. The union assisted the pickets and under-
took an organizational drive among the employees of the Miami Laundry
and induced a strike. Unfortunately (for the academics of this case) the
strike never took place. The Supreme Court of Florida held that since the
employees of the plant were not on strike it was not necessary that a strike
ballot be held. It further held that picketing had no bearing on the strike
and that the right to picket is part of the constitutional freedom of speech.
16. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 779, v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 140 Fla. 865, 868, 193
So. 529, 530 (1939).
17. Weissman v. Jureit, 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (1938).
18. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
19. 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 529 (1939), rehearing denied (1940).
20. 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941).
21. 160 Fla. 667, 36 So.2d 382 (1948).
22. Id. at 673, 36 So.2d at 385. (Emphasis supplied by author).
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This meant that the union and the former employees had a right to announce
their dispute to the world.23
In deciding the Whitehead case, the court cited Thornhill v. Alabama 24
which involved a conviction under an Alabama statute25 forbidding 'loitering
and picketing'. The picketing was peaceful. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that freedom of speech and of press is guaranteed by the
Constitution and that a statute of a state which abridges these rights is un-
constitutional. Thus, in the Whitehead case, the Florida court avoided the
question whether the purpose of the picketing was approved, and related the
case solely to the theory that picketing is freedom of speech and, so long as
peaceful, cannot be abridged.
In 1949 the Supreme Court of Florida rendered its decision in Moore v.
City Dry Cleaners & Laundry.20 1 Here also the union did not represent a
majority of the employees and a majority vote had not been taken to author-
ize any strike. The problem, therefore, was the legality of picketing and
striking without union representation of a majority.
The supreme court stated that the statute, even if constitutional, was
not applicable because it required a vote prior to an actual strike, not prior
to picketingY.2
Further in the decision, the supreme court stated:
A decree that attempts to condition the right of any person
to express his views fully with respect to a labor difficulty or dispute
by any form of publication unattended by violence, force, coercion
or other unlawful or oppressive conduct, or to make the right of
the expression dependent upon the existence of "a labor dispute"
or "strike" in which such person may have a direct interest runs
counter to the Constitution. The fact that statements made under
such circumstances may prove, after publication, to be in fact un-
truthful will not create an exception to the rule stated .... A court
of equity will not enjoin the commission of a threatened libel
or slander; for the imposition of judicial restraints in such an order
would clearly amount to prior censorship, a basic evil denounced
by both the Federal and Statc Constitution.28
The validity of the same statute" was again raised in Johnson v. White
Swan Laundry.80 In this case there had been a strike in three different laun-
dries and in no laundry did the union represent a majority of the employees.
The record shows that the union admitted that no majority vote had ever
been taken ratifying a strike, but, nevertheless, a strike was called and picket-
ing commenced. All parties agreed that the statute controlled and that the
only question was the constitutionality of the statute. The lower court
23. Whitchead v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 Fla. 667, 36 So.2d 382 (1948).
24. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
25. Section 3448 of the Code of Alabama (1923).
26. 41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
27. Id. at 872.
28. Id. at 873.
29. 41 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1949).
30. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(3) (1951).
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ruled that the statute was a constitutional exercise of the police power, was
controlling in the light of the facts and issued an injunction. The lower court
order added, however, "That nothing in this Order shall be construed to
prohibit peaceful picketing by non-strikers under circumstances where Sec-
tion 481.09(3) of the Florida statutes is inapplicable."31 The supreme court
affirmed its decision in the Moore case, holding that the vote was not a
condition precedent to the ordering of a strike, but only to the act of strik-
ing.32 It was indeed difficult to reconcile this finding in view of the fact
that many of the employees of the plaintiff laundries had indeed remained
on strike.
It is apparent from these three laundry cases that the Supreme Court of
Florida avoided deciding the constitutionality of the statute requiring a
majority vote of the employees as a condition precedent to a strike. Similar
statutes had been declared unconstitutional in other states. It would seem
that the statute was unavoidably involved in Johnson v. White Swan Laun-
dry,33 but the constitutional question was evaded by the interpretation placed
by the supreme court upon the facts in the case.
It is obvious, therefore, that picketing is disassociated from striking and
that picketing when peaceful and for the purpose of inviting a strike is law-
ful. It is equally clear, that if a number of employees refrain from going to
work while the picketing is in progress, nevertheless such a situation will not
be construed as coming under the statute requiring a majority vote. Thus it
appears that Section 481.09(3) has been nullified by the reluctance of the
court to apply it to any set of circumstances. Hence Florida has, by circuit-
ous method, followed the decisions of other states34 that have declared such
a statute unconstitutional as being a restraint upon the actions of individual
workmen who might act singly or in concert. The number involved does
not make the act lawful or unlawful.
II. VIOLENCE
The first factor, qualifying the principle that picketing is an exercise
of freedom of speech and as such will not be the proper subject of injunc-
tive relief, is violence. In the case of Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laun-
dry, 5 the court found that the union had been guilty of violence. On the
strength of these findings, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
injunction against the picketing. It was clear that the picketing was so
enmeshed with violence as not to be severable and that the only effective
method of eliminating the violence would be to eliminate the picketing,
which had created the overall situation of tension. The supreme court, how-
31. Johnson v. White Swan Laundry, 41 So.2d 874, 875 (1949).
32. Id. at 876.
33. 41 So.2d 874 (1949).
34. Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945); Alabama Federation of
Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 52, 18 So.2d 810 (1944); American Federation of Labor v.
Reilly, 13 Colo. 90, 155 P.Zd 145 (1944).
35. 41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
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ever, modified the chancellor's sweeping decree, to invalidate only the illegal
activities.
The supreme court further cited Section 13 of the Declaration of Rights,
Constitution of Florida that, "Every person may fully speak and write his
sentiments on all subjects being responsible for the abuse of that right. ."
"In the absence of an express situation plainly requiring reasonable public
regulation in the interest of human life and safety, the right may not be
denied or abridged."30
Thus, where violence is involved, an injunction will be granted against
picketing if the picketing and violence are so enmeshed as to render further
picketing unsafe. In other words, if the mere presence of a picket line is
such as will result in attendant violences, then picketing will be enjoined.
But even if violence is present, the right of free discussion other than in the
picket line will not be enjoined.
II. LAWFUL PURPOSE
Another restriction upon the right to picket has developed in Florida.
The picketing must be for a lawful purpose. The decisions, when read in the
light of decisions of the United States Supreme Court, would seem to hold
that picketing will not be enjoined if its purpose is not unlawful.
The first case in which the purpose of a union was determined to be
unlawful (as distinguished from undesirable as in the Lerner case) 37 is the
case of Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 88 decided in 1950. In this suit
the plaintiff contractor refused to enter into a closed shop contract with the
union. Picketing resulted and the union took the position that a closed shop
contract was not unlawful under the wording of Section 12 of the Declara-
tion of Rights of the Constitution of Florida ("Anti-Closed Shop Amend-
ment"). The chancellor held that a closed shop contract was unlawful
under the constitution, and granted an injunction. The supreme court
affirmed the order, citing statutory authority 9 declaring that activities of
labor unions are a matter of public interest. The statute also stated the
policy of the state that employees shall have the right to self-organization to
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid. It was further
provided that it shall be unlawful for any person to coerce or intimidate any
employee in the enjoyment of these legal rights. The statute further pro-
vided for criminal sanctions. The Supreme Court of Florida stated that the
situation was repugnant to the public policy of the state. Under the facts,
the employer had to suffer injury. If he refused to execute the contract with
the union, his business would be injured by the ordinary union pressures.
36. Id. at 873.
37. Retail Clerks Union, Local 779 of Miami v. Lerner Shops, Inc., 140 Fla. 865,
193 So. 529 (1939).
38. 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
39. FLA. STAT. § 447.01 (1951).
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The employer's execution of the contract would subject him to general
criminal penalties, and the possibility of civil suits by discharged employees,
for his abridgement of their constitutional right to work.
It therefore appears that picketing to require the commission of a
misdemeanor or to require the perpetration of an unlawful act by an em-
ployer is not a lawful objective and is therefore subject to injunction. This
is in keeping with several of the latest decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States40 where injunctions have been upheld in cases in which
the purpose of the union was to require the employer to violate various
state laws or to require an employer to recognize a union as the bargaining
agent of all its employees when the employees did not belong to the union.
Thus, it may be said that Florida is in rapport with the Federal law so far
as granting injunctions where picketing is for an unlawful purpose.
The Robertson decision has been limited by the subsequent case of
Stonaris v. Certain Picketers.41 The plaintiff was the proprietor of a moving
picture theatre in Tampa. One or two men picketed the theatre for the
purpose of coercing the discharge of a non-union operator. It was contended
that the picketing was unlawful because it was in contravention of Section
12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution. The supreme court
refused to apply the rule of the Robertson case42 since the bill of complaint
did not state that the picketing was to require the unlawful closed shop con-
tract. Apparently the court decided the dispute was over the presence of a
non-union workman at the theatre. Thus we see that the Supreme Court of
Florida applied the Robertson case4 3 with caution and adhered to the funda-
mental rule that if picketing is not for an unlawtul purpose, it will not be
enjoined.
In a recent opinion filed June 3, 1952, in the case of Hotel & Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders Union Local 156 v. Cothron," the supreme court
again narrowed the application of the Robertson decision.'- The court
stated that the union had presented to the employer a form of closed shop
agreement, illegal in its provisions, but that it was obvious from the findings
of the chancellor that the picketing was not for the purpose of requiring the
signing of the contract, but rather was in retaliation for the discharge of
three union employees because of their union affiliations. The supreme
court found that on the day of the picketing, the employer was actually
advised as to the reason for the picketing, and that six days later, when the
bill of complaint was filed, the employer knew that he was not being picketed
for a closed shop contract, but rather for his unfair labor practices in dis-
charging the three union employees. The court held that the Robertson
40. Building Service Employees [.U. v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (19501; Giboney v.
Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
41. 46 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1950).
42. Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
43, Ibid.
44. 59 So.2d 366 (FIn. 1952).
45. 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
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decision 46 would not apply. The restraining order entered by the court
below was dissolved and the case ordered dismissed. Another very interest-
ing development in Florida labor law arose in this same case where the court
below had held that the employer should have been advised prior to the
commencement of the picketing as to the true cause thereof in order to give
him an opportunity to rectify the unfair labor practice should he be so in-
clined. The supreme court pointed out that this was no reason for granting
an injunction. 47
To recapitulate, we find that the right of picketing is surrounded with-
limited constitutional protection. Picketing does not carry the unlimited
right of expression that is usually associated with other constitutional guar-
antees and the right can be forfeited or abridged under proper circumstances.
Thus, the courts will no longer go into the reasons for the picketing in order
to determine whether they approve or disapprove the motives of the union
as the Florida court did in the Jureit Bakery48 case, but will only ascertain
whether the objective of the union is to require the employer to do an un-
lawful act. If the answer to this inquiry is in the negative, then peaceful
picketing will be permitted. On the other hand, if attended by violence as
in the Moore case,49 the picketing will be enjoined, but other and disassoci-
ated rights of freedom of speech, such as the full rights of communication,
radio appeal and other methods of communication, will still be protected as
a fundamental constitutional right.
IV. REGULATION OF UNFAIR LABOR PaxCTICES
We now consider the matter of unfair labor practices which give light
to the foregoing discussion of the right to picket.. We have already seen that
the first activities that could be declared as unfair labor practices were: 1.
"black-listing." 2. Not supplying clerks with adequate stools to sit upon.
These unfair labor practices were, of course, directed to management. The
criterion of other unfair labor practices was for many years the personal
opinions of the chancellors involved or of the supreme court justices, during
those years when the Jureit Bakery50 case and the Lerner case51 were the pre-
vailing philosophy.
Because of the few appeals taken, the decision law was very sparse in
this particular area. In the 1943 session of the Legislature, Chapter 21968
was passed which stated the public policy of the State in the following
words:
Because of the activities of labor unions affecting the economic
conditions of the country and the state, entering as they do into
practically every business and industrial enterprise, it is the sense
46. lbid.
47. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union Local 156 v. Cothron, 59
So.2d 366, 369 (Fla. 1952).
48. 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (1938).
49. 41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
50. 132 Fla. 661, 181 So. 898 (1938).
5. 140 Ha. 865, 193 So. 529 (1939).
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of the legislature that such organizations affect the public interest
and are charged with a public use. The working man, unionist or
nonunionist, must be protected. The right to work is the right
to live.
It is here now declared to be the policy of the state, in the
exercise of its sovereign constitutional police power, to regulate the
activities and affairs of labor unions, their officers, agents, organ-
izers and other representatives .... 12
The Legislature went further and actually defined certain terminology
used within the Act."
The same act then guaranteed the right of collective bargaining by
laborers through representatives of their own choosing. This was the first
time that the right of collective bargaining had been granted in the State of
Florida. Florida had never seen anything similar to the Federal Norris-La-
Guardia Anti-injunction Act54 or the Wagner Labor Relations Act 5 or even
the Taft-Hartley Act.50 However, the same act did contain the following
important language:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively, through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection. 7
This guarantee of the right to self-organization or to form, join or assist
labor organizations would appear to make it an unfair labor practice on the
part of the employer to interfere with the right of self-organization or the
forming, joining or assisting of a labor organization. By the same token it
would appear to make an unfair labor practice out of the refusal of the em-
ployer to bargain collectively through representatives of his employees own
choosing. These are two new unfair labor practices added to the law of the
State of Florida.
As a matter of fact, chancellors in cases that have not been appealed
have consistently denied injunctions against picketing where it is shown
that picketing is for the purpose of requiring the employer to bargain with
representatives of his employees, even though the union is the representative
of only a few employees. In other words, it would appear that if a union
represented only one employee, the union would have the right to represent
that one employee in dealing with the employer. So also it has been gener-
ally held in equity courts, without appeals involving more than memorandum
decisions, that injunctions against picketing will be denied where members
of the union have been discharged for obvious union activities, even though
the employer attempts to explain the discharge by giving some other ground.
52. FLA. STAT. § 447.01 (1951).
53. FLA- STAT. § 447.02 (1951).
54. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1946),
55. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §9 151-166 (1946).
56. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1952).
57. FLA. STAT. § 447.03 (1951).
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This last, however, is a question of fact. If an employee is discharged right
at the time of union activity which is the basis of the dispute or the litiga-
tion, courts of equity have always scrutinized the circumstances of the dis-
charge and if they found that the discharge was a retaliation for the union
interests of the employee, then picketing resulting therefrom would not be
enjoined. This was on the theory that picketing is a legitimate exercise of
the freedom of speech to protest the existence of an unfair labor practice.
Chapter 21968!" provides also for the policing of various activities of
labor unions and their officials and makes certain conduct unlawful. Due
to the way this portion of the chapter is drawn it cannot be said that there
is set forth any unfair labor practice of which organized labor might be
guilty. Rather the restrictive provisions of the statute pertain to the opera-
tion, management and activities of the union in a general fashion. For
instance, it is made unlawful to interfere with or prevent the right of fran-
chise of any member of a labor organization. This might be restrictive
against the employer as well as against the union. The right of franchise pre-
served to individuals includes the right of an employee to make complaint
and file charges concerning the violation of the chapter, and the petitioning
to his union regarding any grievance he may have concerning his membership
or employment. (This would appear as a two-edged sword to be wielded
equally against employer and union).
The right is also reserved to members of a union to make known facts
concerning grievances or violations of law to any public officials, and there
is reserved to the employee or union member his right of free petition, lawful
assemblage and free speech. The act further makes it unlawful to prohibit
or prevent any election of any officers of any labor organization. This might
apply, conceivably, to the imposition of a stewardship by an international
union upon a local. It also would certainly apply to any employer or other
individual who might attempt to circumvent an election within a labor
organization.
We now come to the restrictive provisions which the Supreme Court
of the State of Florida has three times refused to apply to circumstances that
otherwise would indicate its application, viz., the provision making it unlaw-
ful to participate in any strike, walkout or cessation of work or continuation
thereof without the same being authorized by a majority vote of the em-
ployees to be governed thereby. 9 This particular section would appear to
be inoperative in Florida at least under the weight of these decisions.
The statute further provides that any election for a strike shall be held
by a secret ballot.10 It is made unlawful to charge, receive or retain any dues,
assessments or other charges in excess of, or not authorized by, the consti-
;8. FLA. SrAT . c. 447 (19;1).
59. FLA. STAT. § 447,09(3) (1951).
60. Fi.A. SrAtr. § 447.09(4) (1951).
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tution and by-laws of any labor organization. 61 This would. appear only to
forbid fraud on the part of a union or union official.
It is made unlawful to act as a business agent without having obtained a
license or permit.62 Licenses and permits are provided in Section 4 of Chap-
ter 21968 which section is also now listed as F.S.A. 447.04. The failure of a
business agent to have a card would appear to be on very much the same
footing as any other citizen doing business without an occupational license.62a
The Act of 1943 also makes it unlawful to solicit members for or to act as a
representative of an existing organization without authority of such labor
organization to do so. 63 The necessity for this clause or its importance to
our code of laws is obscure. The act further makes it unlawful to make any
false statements in an application for a (business agent's) license. 4
It is further made unlawful for any person to seize or occupy property
unlawfully during the existence of a labor dispute. 5 This was obviously for
the purpose of outlawing the sit-down strike, so prevalent in the 1930's.
It is further made unlawful to cause any cessation of work or interfere
with the progress of work by reason of any jurisdictional dispute, grievance
or disagreement between or within a labor organization. 6 This provision
has been the basis of several chancery suits, none of which have been ap-
pealed. The chancellors below have generally concurred in the theory that
in order to present a jurisdictional dispute, the two contesting unions must
both be bona fide. In three chancery suits in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
of Florida, it was shown that one of the contesting unions was a hastily
formed "company union." The chancellors refused to look on the situation
as a bona fide jurisdictional dispute and refused to enjoin a continuation of
the picketing by the bona fide labor union having dispute with the employer.
In other sections, the Act further made it unlawful to coerce or intimi-
date any employee in the enjoyment of his legal rights, including the em-
ployees' right of self-organization, 67 or to intimidate his family, picket his
domicile or injure the person or property of such employee or his family.68
It is obvious that this provision was written as a result of experiences in
other parts of the United States. Florida history reveals no cases on record
at the time of the writing of this legislation that would suggest the necessity
therefor. This provision leads into the next provision of the Act making it
unlawful to picket beyond the area of the industry within which a labor
dispute arises.6 9
This question has been contested vigorously and finally settled adversely
61. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(5) 1951).
62. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(6) (1951).
62a. But cf., Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
63. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(7) (1951).
64. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(8) (1951).
65. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(9) (1951).
66. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(10) (1951).
67. FLA. STAT. § 447.03 (1951).
68. FM. STAT. § 447.09(11) (1951).
69. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(12) (1951).
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to the contentions of organized labor. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 390 v. Wat-
son 70 is the definitive case. J. Tom Watson, Attorney General of the State
of Florida, and Maule Industries, Inc. sought an injunction against the Mi-
ami local teamsters for the reason that the teamsters were picketing Maule
Industries at its plant on an outlying road of Dade County and at its plant
on Miami Beach. There was also picketing at several locations where trucks
of Maule Industries were delivering cement. The union contended that
picketing on a lone road in the far reaches of Dade County was of no avail
and, in effect, of little interest even to the passing alligators and Seminole
Indians. Picketing at the plant of the employer on Miami Beach also
appeared to be of little effect. However, picketing at the point of delivery
of concrete was quite effective inasmuch as other workmen receiving the
concrete necessary to further building activities cooperated with the team-
sters union and showed a disposition to refrain from working behind the
picket lines of the teamsters union. This caused grave injury and damage to
the owner of the premises, to the contractor and to the subcontractor. The
union insisted on its right to picket at the point of delivery of the cement
and further argued that the trucks delivering the cement actually mixed the
cement along the highways of the county. They therefore argued that the
place of business or area of the industry was the original plant where the
truck took on the sand, water and cement; the highways where the mixture
was churned together, and the point of delivery where it was poured into the
forms or moulds. The chancellor permitted the continued picketing at the
principal places of business of Maule Industries, but granted an injunction
against picketing at the point of delivery. The chancellor disagreed with
the union's contention that the statute was so worded as to necessarily imply
that picketing should be limited to the economic area of the industry, not
necessarily the geographical area. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
chancellor by memorandum decision. The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 71 Thus it appears that certain businesses are practically
exempt from being picketed. A firm with principal offices in some down-
town building could not effectively be picketed at their principal place of
business. Their business might be dependent upon deliveries from remote
points even outside the county, as a result of which picketing would be com-
pletely frustrated. In the light of such cases it is obvious that much remains
to be done in the Florida statutory scheme for labor.
V. UNIONS BEFORE THE COURTS
There is an anomaly in Florida Labor Law in connection with F.SA.
447.11, which provides that any labor organization may maintain an action
in its commonly used name and shall be subject to suit in its commonly used
70. 41 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1949).
71. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
Local Union No. 390 v. Watson, 338 U.S. 942 (1950).
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name in the same manner as any corporation authorized to do business in
the state.
In Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry, Linen Drycleaning Drivers, etc.,72
the union sought to enjoin the Miami Laundry Co. from discharging any
person from work because of membership in any labor organization. The
union also sought reinstatement of several discharged union employees. The
supreme court held for the defendant, stating:
Although we are cognizant of the fact that any labor organiza-
tion may maintain an action or suit in its commonly used name by
virtue of Florida Statutes Annotated 481.11 (now 447.11), we are
of the opinion that the bill of conplaint now before us does not
present a proper case for the invocation of equitable jurisdiction on
behalf of the respondent. We fail to find any rights, privileges or
immunities which the bill of complaint discloses have been invaded
or infringed which are rights, privileges or immunities granted or
guaranteed to any labor organization as such. These rights and
guarantees exist only in favor of the individual employee and do not
inure to the benefit of the union in which he holds membership.
They are purely personal to the employee and may be protected
under the facts and circumstances alleged in the instant case only
in an action brought by the employee?3
The supreme court recognized the fact that the several discharged employees
had made the union their bargaining agent, but in effect held that the law
of agency did not apply and that each employee would have to maintain suit
in his own name. This would seem to throw the case of a wrongfully dis-
charged employee back to the original Chipley v. Atkinson case,74 in which
the measure of damages is controlling. This is unique. It would be ex-
tremely difficult for an employee hired on a week-to-week basis, without a
contract, to show any damage other than, perhaps, pay owed to him from
the date of his discharge to his next payday. Assuming that he were dis-
charged on a payday, it is doubtful that damages would be provable in any
sum. It is also doubtful that punitive damages would apply. Thus the
supreme court apparently destroyed the efficacy of the statutes which provide
that employees have the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining,
through representatives of their own choosing. Presently, it would appear
that if employees are fired as a result of exercising these rights, their redress
is very doubtful. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the statute
authorizing labor unions to bring suit specifically refers to the fact that they
may sue only to the extent of any corporation authorized to do business in
this state. It is quite correct that in average cases a corporation cannot sue
for the use and benefit of its stockholders (subject to certain exceptions)
and, by this analogy, it may be academically correct to state that the Legis-
lature did not authorize a union to sue on behalf of its members. The main
business of a union is representing its members in dealings with employers
72. 41 So.2d 305 (17a. 1949).
73. Id. at 307.
74. 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934 (1887).
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and, generally, unions are defendants in a representative capacity. Since the
unions do defend in a representative capacity it is strange, indeed, that Sec-
tion 447.11 is given such a narrow interpretation. It would appear that the
Legislature should clarify its meaning and intent in this particular statute
and should authorize labor organizations to maintain suit for and on behalf
of their members. This is presently accomplished only where the employer
files suit and the union becomes the defendant. Thus to all practical intents
and purposes labor unions are relegated to the status of defendants only.
V1. CLOSED SHOP
The closed shop law has had serious repercussions upon the activities of
organized labor but its ill effects are not felt in all crafts. There are certain
crafts that do not make any reference to a closed shop by contract; because
of the skilled nature of their work, an employer is required to appeal to the
union involved in order to secure employees capable of performing the re-
quired work. These skilled crafts have no problem with the closed shop law.
On the other hand there are unskilled crafts where an employer may find
competent employees on an available labor market, union or non-union, and
can employ a ready crew from any employment agency. In these areas the
closed shop law has presented serious difficulties where organization activity
is concerned. Many employees carry a union card and work union and non-
union jobs alike. The unions representing these non-skilled or semi-skilled
employees have approached the problem in practical fashion. They endeavor
to obtain a contract representing such employees who may be members of
the union. When a contract with an employer has been negotiated for the
use and benefit of only those employees who are members of the union,
asuming that the contract is of any advantage whatsoever to such employees,
there is a natural movement by the non-union employees to join the union
and avail themselves of the advantages of the contract in the particular
establishment involved. Rarely does this technique result in a completely
unionized establishment, and of course the contract does not amount to a
closed shop contract. The employer is always at liberty to hire non-union
workers. It is because of the contract that the non-union workers soon seek
union membership. The right of a union to request a contract on behalf of
such members as may be employed by the particular employer is well estab-
lished. Thus, unionism has survived nothwithstanding the anti-closed shop
law.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious from a survey of legislation proposed by organized labor in
Florida that Florida law does not embody the principal labor goals. Florida
labor has emphasized a legislative program including: (1) repeal of the
anti-closed shop amendment, (2) creation of a Department of Labor at
Cabinet level, (3) a definition as to when a labor injunction will or
will not be granted (a modified Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act),
(4) a state administrative agency to actually enforce the statutorily defined
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unfair labor practices (a modified Wagner act, as aniended). Labor
has realized these objectives in other states more fully than in Florida. The
state's union activities are diverse, and whether urban, rural, industrial or
resort; they range from the citrus workers, phosphate miners, cattlemen and
lumbermen to clerks, bartenders and musicians, and include all the vast
range of human endeavor represented by American unionism, Florida's
increasing industrialization will soon demonstrate the inadequacies of the
present Florida. Labor Law.
